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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                       
 
 
BRODY, District Judge, 
 
 Plaintiffs, a Pentecostal minister and his non-profit 
incorporated ministry, appeal the grant of summary judgment on 
their claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) alleging that a 
municipal borough and its council members violated their free 
exercise and other rights by intentionally impeding access to 
their tent revival meetings.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment on the Free Exercise count because the plaintiffs had 
not introduced sufficient evidence that the Borough's actions 
placed a "substantial burden" on plaintiffs' religious exercise.  
Because we believe that the pivotal issue in a case alleging 
deliberate interference with religious activity is not the extent 
of the burden on religious exercise, but instead whether the 
defendants intended to impose a burden, we reverse the grant of 
summary judgment on the Free Exercise claim, and remand to the 
District Court for reconsideration of the record consistent with 
our holding. 
 I. 
 Taking all inferences to be drawn from the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the plaintiffs/appellants, Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-589 
  
(1986), the following events can be gleaned from the record 
before us. 
 Plaintiffs Reverend Andrew D. Brown and his Abundant 
Life Ministries arranged to conduct Pentecostal tent revival 
meetings in the Borough of Mahaffey from August 2-7, 1992.  The 
plaintiffs had permission to hold the meetings on property owned 
by the Penn Central Corporation, which lies adjacent to a 
baseball park owned by the Borough called "Scout Park."  Scout 
Park and the Penn Central property are divided by a dirt road 
owned by the Borough.  Reverend Brown was also negotiating to 
purchase the Penn Central property.     
 At a Borough council meeting held shortly before the 
scheduled revival meetings the council members discussed a 
petition to erect a gate separating Scout Park from the Penn 
Central property.  At the same meeting the council discussed how 
to handle plaintiffs' planned revival meetings.  See Deposition 
of council member Bakaysa.  The council summoned Reverend Brown 
to the meeting to discuss his plans for the revival.  The 
discussion escalated into argument.  Brown also informed the 
council that he was negotiating to purchase the Penn Central 
property.  Defendant Bakaysa acknowledged that this circumstance 
angered the Council members.1  The council members informed 
                     
     
1
  The District Court also found that council members 
"upbraided Brown with abusive language."  This fact does not 
appear in the record before us. 
  
Reverend Brown of their intention to erect gates between the 
properties.  A gate was erected on July 29, 1992. 
 The parties eventually agreed that the gates would be 
opened each evening to accommodate the meetings.  The first two 
revival meetings occurred without event.  At the third meeting, 
on Tuesday, August 4, 1992, the plaintiffs found the gates 
locked.  Attendees of that night's meeting were unable to drive 
up to the tent; instead, they were forced to park outside the 
gate and walk 100 to 200 feet to reach the tent.  Plaintiffs 
contend that disabled individuals seeking the Ministry's faith 
healing were among the expected attendees, and may have been 
deterred from further attendance during the week because of the 
difficulty in reaching the tent.  Council member Bakaysa 
testified that he was aware that disabled individuals were among 
the expected worshippers.  Council members represented that they 
had intentionally locked the gate because of noise and activity 
on the site late at night on Monday.  Plaintiffs were never 
informed of the council members' decision to lock the gate. 
 After discussion between the parties, the Borough 
agreed to open the gate for the rest of the planned meetings; it 
did so on Wednesday and Thursday.  On Friday, August 7, 1992, the 
plaintiffs again encountered a locked gate that they attempted to 
break open.  Council member Kim Struble came over, and offered to 
open the gate; according to the plaintiffs the offer was made in 
a mocking manner.  The plaintiffs continued to try to break the 
  
gate open.  Struble contacted council member Bakaysa who brought 
a state police officer to the scene.  The dispute was eventually 
resolved with Bakaysa and Reverend Brown agreeing that Reverend 
Brown would repair the gate, and the Borough promising not to 
press vandalism charges. 
 After the final revival meeting, on August 7, the 
plaintiffs who remained behind to clean up and pack the equipment 
found their egress blocked by the gate being locked again.  
Reverend Brown testified that he had earlier observed council 
members and police officers at the gate, and heard pounding at 
the gate preceding the time when he discovered the gate locked.  
The next morning, the plaintiffs opened the gate by breaking the 
bolt with a sledgehammer in order to remove their equipment. 
 In February, 1993, the Borough bought the Penn Central 
Property from Penn Central Corporation.  Defendants acknowledge 
becoming more motivated to purchase the property after becoming 
aware of the plaintiffs' hopes of purchasing the property. 
 The plaintiffs sued individual council members and the 
Borough under federal civil rights laws, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1985(3), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and Pennsylvania law for damages and injunctive relief, alleging 
the following counts:  Free Exercise of Religion under the First 
Amendment; Freedom of Association under the First Amendment; 
Invasion of Privacy under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; 
Establishment Clause under the First Amendment; Equal Protection; 
  
a general "constitutional tort" invasion under §§ 1983 and 
1985(3); the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act; False 
Imprisonment; and Breach of Contract; and Interference with 
Prospective Economic Advantage. 
 The District Court granted summary judgment on all 
counts.  The plaintiffs appealed the court's holding on 
plaintiffs' Free Exercise, Establishment Clause, Equal 
Protection, and "constitutional tort" counts.     
 II. 
 The core of plaintiffs' Free Exercise contention is 
that the Borough manifested hostility towards their religious 
activity by intentionally locking the gate to impede access to 
the revival meetings.  See Appellants' Brief at 11.  The Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that Congress 
"shall make no law . . .  prohibiting the free exercise of 
[religion]"; at its undisputed minimum this command enjoins 
government from intentionally burdening religious worship.  Cf. 
Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Florida, 721 F.2d 729, 733-34 (11th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984) ("governmental 
action violates the Constitution if it is based upon disagreement 
with religious tenets or practices, or is aimed at impeding 
religion"); see also Robert H. Bork, The Supreme Court and the 
Religious Clauses, Proceedings of the National Religious Freedom 
Conference of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights 
83, 84 (1988) ("The free exercise clause might have been read 
  
simply to prohibit laws that directly and intentionally penalize 
religious observance.  Instead, [it has] been read to have far 
greater breadth and severity.").  Indeed, "it was 'historical 
instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave 
concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.'"  Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217, 2226 (1993) (citation omitted).  This common understanding 
of the Free Exercise Clause has resulted in the circumstance that 
"few States would be so naive as to enact a law directly 
prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such."  
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
 The District Court ruled that plaintiffs' Free Exercise 
claim failed because "even assuming that plaintiffs' suspicions 
about the defendants biases and motivations are true . . . the 
plaintiffs have not adduced evidence of a 'substantial burden'", 
as required by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000.   This analysis is inappropriate for a free exercise claim 
involving intentional burdening of religious exercise.  The 
"substantial burden" requirement was developed in the Supreme 
Court's free exercise jurisprudence, and codified in the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, in order to 
balance the tension between religious rights and valid government 
goals advanced by "neutral and generally applicable laws" which 
create an incidental burden on religious exercise.  See 
  
Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J. concurring) 
("we have respected both the First Amendment's express textual 
mandate and the governmental interest in regulation of conduct by 
requiring the government to justify any substantial burden on 
religiously motivated conduct . . . ").  See also Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).  The rare 
cases which address acts or laws which target religious activity 
have never limited liability to instances where a "substantial 
burden" was proved by the plaintiff.  See e.g. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
113 S. Ct. 2217.  Applying such a burden test to non-neutral 
government actions would make petty harassment of religious 
institutions and exercise immune from the protection of the First 
Amendment.  A burden test is only necessary to place logical 
limits on free exercise rights in relation to laws or actions 
designed to achieve legitimate, secular purposes.  Because 
government actions intentionally discriminating against religious 
exercise a fortiori serve no legitimate purpose, no balancing 
test is necessary to cabin religious exercise in deference to 
such actions.   
 Accordingly, the determinative issue for the trial 
court on summary judgment was not whether the plaintiffs had 
proffered sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact 
regarding the extent of the burden created -- a test which the 
plaintiffs fail -- but instead whether there is sufficient 
  
evidence to create a material issue of fact regarding whether the 
defendants intentionally impeded the plaintiffs' religious 
activity.  We therefore remand to the District Court for a 
determination, based on consideration of the entire record, of 
whether the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence on the 
issue of intentional targeting to resist summary judgment. 
 III. 
 The other issues raised by plaintiffs on appeal 
constitute little more than a repackaging of the free exercise 
count to fit other constitutional labels.  The Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment restricts government capacity to 
favor a religion, or religion in general.  The plaintiffs contend 
that the hostility displayed and the impediments imposed on their 
own religious exercise translates into favoritism towards every 
other religion.  This logic would transform every viable free 
exercise action into an Establishment Clause claim.  Such a 
circumstance finds no support in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.   
 A government action is subject to "strict scrutiny" 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if 
it discriminates against a "suspect class," or if it interferes 
with a "fundamental right."  Kardmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 
487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988).  The plaintiffs argue that the 
violation of their fundamental right to free exercise of religion 
constitutes an equal protection violation.  However, in order to 
  
maintain an equal protection claim with any significance 
independent of the free exercise count which has already been 
raised, the plaintiffs must also allege and prove that they 
received different treatment from other similarly situated 
individuals or groups.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 
F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 
355 (4th Cir. 1994)  The plaintiffs have proffered no evidence to 
that effect.   
 In addition to the alleged Free Exercise, Establishment 
Clause, and Equal Protection claims, the plaintiffs state a 
separate claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (3) for 
"constitutional torts by and of themselves."  Brief of Appellants 
at 31.  The plaintiffs must assert a specific federal 
constitutional or statutory right in order to maintain a claim 
under the civil rights laws.  See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 
807, 811 (1994) ("[t]he first step in any [1983] claim is to 
identify the specific constitutional right infringed").  The 
plaintiffs have asserted several constitutional violations; they 
cannot attach a "catch-all" tort claim as a fallback if those 
specific constitutional claims fail.  
 IV.   
 We will therefore reverse the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' free exercise claim and 
remand that issue to the District Court for proceedings 
  
consistent with this opinion.  We will affirm on all other 
counts. 
  
